This Remuneration Report describes the executive remuneration philosophy, programs and objectives of the Remuneration Committee and the Board of Directors (the “Board”), as well as the executive remuneration plans and programs implemented by James Hardie Industries plc. For purposes of this discussion, references to “James Hardie”, the “Company”, “we”, “our” and “us” all refer to James Hardie Industries plc.

We are not required to produce a remuneration report under applicable Irish, Australian or US rules or regulations. However, taking into consideration our significant Australian and US shareholder bases and our primary listing on the Australian Securities Exchange (“ASX”), we have voluntarily produced a remuneration report consistent with those provided by similarly situated companies for non-binding shareholder approval since 2005.

This Remuneration Report outlines the key remuneration plans and programs and share ownership information for our Board of Directors and certain of our senior executive officers (Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) and the other three highest paid executive officers based on total compensation that was earned or accrued for fiscal year 2017) (“Senior Executive Officers”) in fiscal year 2017, and also includes an outline of the key changes for fiscal year 2018. Further details of these changes are set out in the 2017 Notice of Annual General Meeting (“AGM”).

We first provide a summary of our business performance and the key remuneration considerations and decisions made in fiscal year 2017. We then describe in detail our remuneration philosophy, the individual elements of our remuneration program and the linkage between our remuneration programs and our pay-for-performance philosophy. For fiscal year 2017, our Senior Executive Officers are:

Mr Fisher is included in this Remuneration Report based on his level of compensation and status as an executive officer as of 31 March 2017. Subsequent to 31 March 2017, Mr Fisher voluntarily terminated his employment with us as of 3 April 2017.

This Remuneration Report has been adopted by our Board on the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee.

FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

Certain statements in this Remuneration Report may constitute “forward-looking statements” as defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. James Hardie Industries plc (James Hardie or the Company) uses such words as “believe”, “anticipate”, “plan”, “expect”, “intend”, “target”, “estimate”, “project”, “predict”, “forecast”, “guideline”, “aim”, “will”, “should”, “likely”, “continue”, “may”, “objective”, “outlook”, and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements but are not the exclusive means of identifying such statements. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements and all such forward-looking statements are qualified in their entirety by reference to the following cautionary statements.

Forward-looking statements are based on James Hardie’s current expectations, estimates and assumptions and because forward-looking statements address future results, events and conditions, they, by their very nature, involve inherent risks and uncertainties, many of which are unforeseeable and beyond the Company’s control. Many factors could cause the actual results, performance or achievements of James Hardie to be materially different from those expressed or implied in this Remuneration Report, including, among others, the risks and uncertainties set forth in Section 3 “Risk Factors” in James Hardie’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended 31 March 2017; changes in general economic, political, governmental and business conditions globally and in the countries in which James Hardie does business; changes in interest rates; changes in inflation rates; changes in exchange rates; the level of construction generally; changes in cement demand and prices; changes in raw material and energy prices; changes in business strategy and various other factors. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialise, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those described herein. These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this Remuneration Report and James Hardie does not assume any obligation to update them, except as required by law. Investors are encouraged to review James Hardie’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, and specifically the risk factors discussed therein, as it contains important disclosures regarding the risks attendant to investing in our securities.

NON-GAAP FINANCIAL INFORMATION

This Remuneration Report contains financial measures that are not considered a measure of financial performance under United States generally accepted accounting principles (“US GAAP”) and should not be considered to be more meaningful than the equivalent US GAAP measure. Management has included such measures to provide investors with an alternative method for assessing its operating results in a manner that is focused on the performance of its ongoing operations. Additionally, management uses such non-GAAP financial measures for the same purposes. However, these non-GAAP financial measures are not prepared in accordance

with US GAAP, may not be reported by all of James Hardie’s competitors and may not be directly comparable to similarly titled measures of James Hardie’s competitors due to potential differences in the exact method of calculation. For additional information regarding the non-GAAP financial measures presented in this Remuneration Report, including a reconciliation of each non-GAAP financial measure to the equivalent US GAAP measure, see the sections titled “Definition and Other Terms” and “Non-US GAAP Financial Measures” included in James Hardie’s Management’s Analysis of Results for the fourth quarter and twelve months ended 31 March 2017.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fiscal Year 2017 Business Highlights

We delivered strong financial performance in fiscal year 2017, highlighted by adjusted net operating profit of US$248.6 million, adjusted earnings before interest and taxes (“EBIT”) of US$354.3 million, and net sales of US$1.9 billion. In addition, we achieved a 12% increase in net cash provided by operating activities, compared to fiscal year 2016, and US$276.6 million of capital returned to shareholders through a combination of dividends and the previously announced share buyback program.

The following graphs show our performance for key financial measures during fiscal year 2017, with a comparison to prior corresponding periods:

Fiscal Year 2017 Compensation Highlights

Our fiscal year 2017 compensation continued to reflect and promote our pay-for-performance philosophy and our stated goal to position Senior Executive Officer fixed base salary and benefits at the median and total target direct remuneration (comprising fixed and target variable remuneration) at the 75th percentile of our Peer Group (defined herein), if stretch short- and long-term target performance goals are met. During May 2016, the Board, with the assistance of the Remuneration Committee and its independent remuneration advisers, undertook its annual review of our existing remuneration policies, programs and arrangements and determined the following for fiscal year 2017 pay programs:

Performance Linkage with Remuneration Policy

During its annual review, the Remuneration Committee assessed our performance in fiscal year 2017 against:

Based on that review, the Board and the Remuneration Committee concluded that management’s performance in fiscal year 2017 was on the whole: (i) at target on growth measures and slightly below target on earnings, resulting in STI variable remuneration outcomes being below target for fiscal year 2017; and (ii) when taken together with performance in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, at the 59th percentile of our Peer Group on TSR performance, above expectations on ROCE performance, and above expectations on long-term strategic measures included in the Scorecard, resulting in LTI variable remuneration being above target for fiscal years 2015-2017.

More details about this assessment, including the percentage of the maximum variable remuneration awarded to or forfeited by Senior Executive Officers is set out on pages 8 through 13 of this Remuneration Report.

DESCRIPTION OF 2017 REMUNERATION ELEMENTS

Base Salaries and Other Fixed

Remuneration Benefits

Base salary provides a guaranteed level of income that recognises the market value of the position and internal equities between roles, and the individual’s capability, experience and performance. Annual base salary increases are not automatic. Base salaries for Senior Executive Officers are positioned around the market median for positions of similar responsibility and are reviewed by the Remuneration Committee each year.

In addition, Senior Executive Officers may receive certain other limited fixed benefits, such as medical and life insurance benefits, car allowances, participation in executive wellness programs and an annual financial planning allowance. For fiscal year 2017, the base salary and value of other fixed benefits for each of our Senior Executive Officers is provided in the Base Pay and Other Benefits columns of the remuneration table in the section titled “Remuneration Paid to Senior Executive Officers”.

Retirement Plan

In every country in which we operate, we offer employees access to pension, superannuation or individual retirement savings plans consistent with the laws of the respective country.

In the US, we sponsor a defined contribution plan, the James Hardie Retirement and Profit Sharing Plan (the “401(k) Plan”). The 401(k) Plan is a tax-qualified retirement and savings plan covering all US employees, including our Senior Executive Officers, subject to certain eligibility requirements. Participating employees were able to elect to reduce their current annual compensation by up to US$18,000 in calendar year 2016 and have the amount of such reduction contributed to the 401(k) Plan, with a maximum eligible compensation limit of US$265,000. In addition, we match employee contributions dollar for dollar up to a maximum of the first 6% of an employee’s eligible compensation.

Incentive Arrangements

In addition to the base salary and other fixed benefits provided to our Senior Executive Officers, the Remuneration Committee reviews and approves a combination of both short-term and long- term variable incentive programs on an annual basis.

For fiscal year 2017, our variable incentive plans for Senior Executive Officers were as follows:

STI Plans

On an annual basis, the Remuneration Committee approves an STI target for all Senior Executive Officers, expressed as a percentage of base salary, which is allocated between individual goals and Company goals under the IP and CP Plans, respectively. For fiscal year 2017, the STI target percentage for Mr Gries was 125% of base salary, 70% of base salary for Mr Marsh, and 60% of base salary for Messrs Fisher, Gadd and Blasko, with 80% allocated to the CP Plan and 20% allocated to the IP Plan for all Senior Executive Officers.

Since fiscal year 2014, the Remuneration Committee has applied a ‘circuit breaker’ to the STI plans, which for Senior Executive Officers will prevent payment of any STI under the CP and IP Plans unless our performance exceeds a level approved by the Remuneration Committee each year. For fiscal year 2017, the ‘circuit breaker’ was set at 60% of our fiscal year 2017 plan Adjusted EBIT (indexed to housing starts) less any impairment costs the Remuneration Committee determines should be disregarded.

CP Plan

The CP Plan is based on a series of payout matrices for the US and Asia Pacific businesses, which provide a range of possible payouts depending on our performance against hurdles which assess volume growth relative to, and above, market (“Growth Measure”), earnings (“Return Measure”), and for the US business, performance of the interiors business and performance against certain “wood-look” competitors. Each Senior Executive Officer can receive between 0% and 300% of their STI target allocated to the CP Plan based on the results of the payout multiple the Senior Executive Officer is tied to. All Senior Executive Officers are tied to either the US multiple (Mr Gadd) or a composite multiple derived from the metrics for the US (80%) and Asia Pacific (20%) businesses combined (Messrs Gries, Marsh, Fisher and Blasko).

Payout Matrices

We use both performance measures (Growth Measure and Return Measure) in the payout matrices for our US and Asia Pacific businesses in order to ensure that as management increases its top line market growth focus, it does not do so at the expense of short- to medium-term earnings. Management is encouraged to balance market growth and earnings returns since achievement of a higher reward requires management to generate both strong earnings and growth relative to and above market. Higher returns on one measure at the expense of the other measure may result in a lower reward or no reward at all.

LTI Plans

Each year, the Remuneration Committee approves an LTI target for all Senior Executive Officers. The approved target is allocated between three separate components to ensure that each Senior Executive Officer’s performance is assessed across factors considered important for sustainable long-term value creation:

Awards issued under the LTI Plans are issued pursuant to the terms of the LTIP. During fiscal year 2017, our Senior Executive Officers were granted the following awards under the LTIP:

RSUs issued under our LTI programs will be settled upon vesting in CUFS on a 1-to-1 basis. Unless the context indicates otherwise, in this Remuneration Report when we refer to our common stock, we are referring to the shares of our common stock that are represented by CUFS.

ROCE RSUs (40% of target LTI)

The Remuneration Committee introduced ROCE RSUs in fiscal year 2013 because the US housing market had stabilised to an extent which permitted the setting of multi-year financial metrics. The Remuneration Committee believes ROCE RSUs remain an appropriate component of the LTI Plan because they:

Consistent with fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the maximum payout for the ROCE RSUs is 200% of target LTI. ROCE is determined by dividing Adjusted EBIT by Adjusted Capital Employed¹. The ROCE hurdles will be indexed for changes to US and Asia Pacific addressable housing starts. The resulting Adjusted Capital Employed for each quarter of any fiscal year will be averaged to better reflect Capital Employed through a year rather than at a certain point in time.

ROCE hurdles for the ROCE RSUs are based on historical results and take into account the recovering US housing market and better optimisation of our manufacturing plants. The three-year average ROCE for fiscal years 2014, 2015 and 2016 was 27.6%.

The hurdles for ROCE RSUs granted in fiscal year 2017 (for performance in fiscal years 2017 to 2019) were changed from those granted in fiscal year 2016 as follows:

At the conclusion of this three-year performance period, the Remuneration Committee will review management’s performance based on the quality of the returns balanced against management’s delivery of market share growth and performance against the Scorecard. Following this review, the Remuneration Committee can exercise negative discretion to reduce the number of shares received on vesting of the ROCE RSUs. This discretion can only be applied to reduce the number of shares which will vest.

“Adjusted Capital Employed” will be calculated as Total Assets minus Current Liabilities as reported in our financial results; adjusted by: (i) excluding balance sheet items related to legacy issues (such as asbestos adjustments), dividends payable and deferred taxes; (ii) adding back asset impairment charges in the relevant period, unless otherwise determined by the Remuneration Committee; (iii) adding back leasehold assets for manufacturing facilities and other material leased assets; and (iv) deducting all greenfield construction-in-progress, and any brownfield construction-in-progress projects involving capacity expansion that are individually greater than US$20 million, until such assets reach commercial production and are transferred to the fixed asset register.

ROCE RSUs Vesting in Fiscal Year 2017

(For Fiscal Years 2014-2016)

As a component of the fiscal year 2014 LTI Plan, we granted ROCE RSUs in September 2013. The ROCE RSUs comprised 40% of each Senior Executive Officer’s LTI target and were granted assuming maximum performance (200% of target). Vesting of the ROCE RSUs is dependent on the average ROCE performance for fiscal years 2014-2016 and is subject to the Remuneration Committee’s negative discretion based on its judgment regarding the quality of returns balanced against management’s delivery of market share growth. The ROCE performance hurdles for this grant were approved as follows:

Based solely on the average ROCE result for fiscal years 2014-2016 of 27.6%, 100% of the ROCE RSUs granted (or 200% of target) would have vested. However, based on the Remuneration Committee’s assessment of the quality of returns balanced against management’s delivery of market share growth, the Remuneration Committee determined that it would apply negative discretion in the amount of 35%. As such, 65% (or 130% of target) of the outstanding fiscal year 2014 ROCE RSUs vested on 16 September 2016. Unvested ROCE RSUs from this grant were forfeited.

ROCE RSUs Vesting for Fiscal Years 2015-2017

As a component of the fiscal year 2015 LTI Plan, we granted ROCE RSUs in September 2014. The ROCE RSUs comprised 40% of each Senior Executive Officer’s LTI target and were granted assuming maximum performance (200% of target). Vesting of the ROCE RSUs is dependent on the average ROCE performance for fiscal years 2015-2017 and is subject to the Remuneration Committee’s negative discretion based on its judgment regarding the quality of returns balanced against management’s delivery of market share growth. The ROCE performance hurdles for this grant were approved as follows:

Based solely on the average ROCE result for fiscal years 2015-2017 of 29.9%, 100% of the ROCE RSUs granted (or 200% of target) would have vested. However, based on the Remuneration Committee’s assessment of the quality of returns balanced against management’s delivery of market share growth, the Remuneration Committee determined that it would apply negative discretion in the amount of 40%. As such, 60% (or 120% of target) of the outstanding fiscal year 2015 ROCE RSUs will vest on 16 September 2017. Unvested ROCE RSUs from this grant will be forfeited.

Relative TSR RSUs (30% of target LTI)

The Remuneration Committee believes that Relative TSR RSUs continue to be an appropriate component of the LTI Plan because they provide alignment with shareholders. Even if macro-economic conditions create substantial shareholder value, Senior Executive Officers will only receive payouts if the TSR of our shares exceeds a specified percentage of our Peer Group over a performance period.

We have used Relative TSR RSUs in our LTI Plan since fiscal year 2009. Consistent with fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the maximum payout for Relative TSR RSUs granted in fiscal year 2017 is 200% of target LTI.

Relative TSR measures changes in our share price and the share prices of our Peer Group; and assumes all dividends and capital returns are reinvested when paid. For fiscal year 2017, our relative TSR performance will be measured against the Peer Group over a 36 to 54 month period from grant date, with testing at the 36th month, 48th month and at the end of the 54 month period. To eliminate the impact of short-term share price changes, the starting point and each test date are measured using a 20 trading-day average closing price. Relative TSR RSUs will vest based on the following straight-line schedule:

For the fiscal year 2018 Relative TSR RSU component, the Remuneration Committee has determined that relative TSR performance will be measured against the Peer Group over a 36 month period only. A complete description of the changes to our fiscal year 2018 LTI program is set out in the section titled “Changes to LTI Variable Compensation for Fiscal Year 2018” later in this Remuneration Report. The Remuneration Committee will continue to monitor the design of the Relative TSR RSU component of the LTI Plan for Senior Executive Officers with the aim of balancing investor preferences with the ability to motivate and retain Senior Executive Officers.

TSR RSUs Vesting in Fiscal Year 2017

As part of the fiscal year 2012 LTI Plan, in September 2011 we granted five year Relative TSR RSUs to senior executives. Vesting of these Relative TSR RSUs was dependent on our TSR performance relative to a set peer group, based on the following schedule:

In September 2016, the final test of relative TSR performance was completed, resulting in our TSR performance at just over the 65th percentile of the peer group. This brought the total vesting percentage for these grants over the five-year performance period to 74% of the Relative TSR RSUs granted (or 222% of target). The remaining unvested Relative TSR RSUs from this grant were forfeited.

As part of the fiscal year 2013 LTI Plan, in September 2012 we granted five year Relative TSR RSUs to senior executives. Vesting of these Relative TSR RSUs was dependent on our TSR performance relative to a set peer group, based on the following schedule:

In September 2016, the third test of relative TSR performance was completed, resulting in our TSR performance at just above the 83rd percentile of the peer group. This brought the total vesting percentage for these grants to 100% of the Relative TSR RSUs granted (or 200% of target).

As part of the fiscal year 2014 LTI Plan, in September 2013 we granted four and a half year Relative TSR RSUs to Senior Executive Officers. Vesting of these Relative TSR RSUs was dependent on our TSR performance relative to a set peer group, based on the following schedule:

In September 2016, the first test of relative TSR performance was completed, resulting in our TSR performance at just above the 91st percentile of the peer group. As a result, 100% of the outstanding Relative TSR RSUs (or 200% of target) vested.

Scorecard LTI (30% of target LTI)

Scorecard LTI have been a component of our LTI Plan since fiscal year 2010. Each year, the Remuneration Committee approves a number of key management objectives and the measures it expects to see achieved in relation to these objectives. These objectives are incorporated into that year’s grant of Scorecard LTI. At the end of the three-year performance period, the Remuneration Committee assesses our Senior Executive Officers’ collective performance on each key objective and each individual Senior Executive Officer’s contribution to those achievements (with scores between 0 and 100) and the Board reviews this assessment. Senior Executive Officers may receive different ratings depending on the contribution they have made during the three-year performance period. Although most of the objectives in the Scorecard have quantitative targets, we consider some of the targets to be commercial-in-confidence. Consistent from fiscal year 2010, the maximum payout for Scorecard LTI is 300% of target LTI.

The Remuneration Committee believes that the Scorecard LTI continues to be an appropriate component of its LTI Plan because it:

No specific weighting is applied to any single objective and the final Scorecard assessment reflects an element of judgment by the Board. The Board may only exercise negative discretion (i.e., to reduce the amount of Scorecard LTI that will ultimately vest). It cannot enhance the maximum reward that can be received.

The amount received by Senior Executive Officers is based on both our share price performance over the three years from the grant date and the Senior Executive Officer’s Scorecard rating. At the start of the three-year performance period, we calculate the number of shares each Senior Executive Officer could have acquired if they received a maximum payout on the Scorecard LTI at that time (based on a 20 trading-day average closing price). Depending on the Senior Executive Officer’s rating (between 0 and 100), between 0% and 100% of the Senior Executive Officer’s Scorecard LTI awards will vest at the end of the three-year performance period. Each Senior Executive Officer will receive a cash payment based on our share price at the end of the period (based on a 20 trading-day average closing price) multiplied by the number of shares they could have acquired at the start of the performance period, adjusted downward in accordance with their Scorecard rating.

Further details related to the Scorecard for fiscal year 2017, including the method of measurement, historical performance against the proposed measures and the Board of Director’s expectations, were previously set out in our Remuneration Report for fiscal year 2016. An assessment of our Scorecard performance for fiscal years 2015-2017 is set out below. We will provide an explanation of the final assessment of performance under the Scorecard for fiscal years 2017-2019 at the conclusion of fiscal year 2019.

CHANGES TO REMUNERATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

Remuneration for Fiscal Year 2018

During May 2017, the Board, with the assistance of the Remuneration Committee and its independent remuneration advisers, undertook its annual review of our existing remuneration policies, programs and arrangements and determined to implement certain changes for fiscal year 2018.

CEO Compensation

For fiscal year 2018, there will be no changes to the CEO’s base salary, target STI or target LTI.

Other Senior Executive Officer Compensation

Base pay, and target LTI increases in fiscal year 2018 for other Senior Executive Officers, excluding Mr Fisher who resigned from James Hardie effective 3 April 2017 and did not receive any pay adjustments, are as follows:

There are no changes to target STI for other Senior Executive Officers for fiscal year 2018. The base salary increase for Mr Marsh was made to continue to align his compensation package with our CEO succession plan and our need to retain key senior executives through the eventual CEO transition process. Base salary and LTI target increases for Mr Gadd were made to properly align his overall compensation package with the increase in role scope and accountability that occurred for Mr Gadd during fiscal year 2017. The base salary increase for Mr Blasko was made in line with our annual compensation review guidelines and were adjusted as required to maintain positioning relative to market merit increase levels. The small increase to Mr Blasko’s LTI target was made to better align his LTI target value with the 75th percentile of the market, consistent with our remuneration philosophy.

STI Plans

There will be no changes to the operation of the IP or CP Plans for fiscal year 2018 other than to establish new commercial-in-confidence targets aligned with our strategic initiatives as we do every year.

LTI Plan

The Remuneration Committee believes the three components of the LTI Plan continue to (i) align management objectives with shareholder interests (Relative TSR RSU component), (ii) promote the appropriate internal management behaviours related to operating efficiency and the profitability of JHIplc’s assets (ROCE RSU component), and (iii) emphasise strategic long-term priorities (Scorecard LTI component). As such, the fiscal year 2018 LTI Plan will continue to be comprised of these three components. However, after careful consideration of strategic priorities, as well as investor feedback and LTI Plan design alternatives, the Remuneration Committee has made the following changes to the design of the LTI Plan for fiscal year 2018:

The Remuneration Committee made these changes to strike a balance of strategic and operational performance with financial and share price performance metrics within the LTI Plan (re-allocation of the LTI target amongst the three components), reflect the Board’s requirement for improved ROCE, and address shareholder concerns (removal of the re-testing feature).

The Board and Remuneration Committee feel the LTI Plan for fiscal year 2018 will continue to have the desired effect of balancing the short-term focus of base salaries and the STI program by tying equity-based rewards to performance achieved over multi-year periods and aligning equity incentives with long-term shareholder interests.

The 2017 Notice of AGM contains further details on the Relative TSR RSU and ROCE RSU grants for fiscal year 2018. Changes to ROCE performance hurdles and Scorecard objectives for fiscal year 2018 are set forth below.

Changes to LTI Variable Compensation for Fiscal Year 2018

ROCE RSUs

To reflect the Board’s requirement for improved and sustainable operational efficiencies, the Remuneration Committee increased the hurdles for fiscal year 2018 ROCE RSUs (for performance in fiscal years 2018 to 2020) from the hurdles for fiscal year 2017 ROCE RSUs, thereby making it more difficult to achieve minimum, at target and maximum vesting:

Relative TSR RSUs

The Remuneration Committee has removed the re-testing feature such that relative TSR performance for fiscal year 2018 Relative TSR RSUs is tested once on the third anniversary of the grant date. Any awards which do not vest based on this performance test will be forfeited.

OTHER EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PRACTICES

Clawback Provisions

The Remuneration Committee has established an executive performance-based compensation clawback policy in connection with performance-based compensation paid or awarded to certain executives. The clawback policy provides that the Board may, in all appropriate circumstances, recover from any current or former executive regardless of fault, that portion of any performance-based compensation erroneously awarded: (i) based on financial information required to be reported under applicable US or Australian securities laws or applicable exchange listing standards that would not have been paid in the three completed fiscal years preceding the year(s) in which an accounting restatement is required to correct a material error; or (ii) during the previous three completed fiscal year as a result of any errors or omissions in objective, calculable performance measures contained in formal papers presented to and relied upon by the Board for purposes of determining compensation to be paid or awarded, where the absence of such errors or omissions would have resulted in there being a material negative impact on the amount of performance-based compensation paid or awarded. The clawback policy applies to any person designated as a participant by the Board in the annual LTI Plan and applies to any compensation that is granted, earned or vested based wholly or in part upon the attainment of any financial or other objective, calculable performance measure under any incentive, bonus, retirement or equity compensation plan maintained by the Company, including, without limitation, the STI Plan and LTI Plan. Salaries, discretionary bonuses, time-based equity awards and bonuses or equity awards based on subjective, non-financial measures, including strategic or personal performance metrics, are excluded.

The excess compensation requiring recovery shall be the amount of performance-based compensation that an executive received, based on the erroneous data, less the amount that would have been paid to the executive based on the restated or corrected data. All recoverable amounts shall be calculated on a pre-tax basis. For equity awards still held at the time of the recovery, the recoverable amount shall be the amount vested in excess of the number that should have vested under the restated or corrected financial reporting measure. For vested equity awards which have already been sold, the recoverable amount shall be the sale proceeds the executive received with respect to the excess number of shares.

In addition, all LTI grants made to Messrs Gries, Marsh and Fisher were subject to a specific clawback provision for violation of a limited non-compete provision that specifically prohibits executives from working for designated competitors or for any company that may enter the fiber cement market within two years of departure.

Stock Ownership Guidelines

The Remuneration Committee believes that Senior Executive Officers should hold a meaningful level of our stock to further align their interests with those of our shareholders. We have adopted stock ownership guidelines for the CEO and other Senior Executive Officers, respectively, which require them to accumulate holdings of three times and one times their base salary, respectively, in our stock over a period of five years from the effective date of the guidelines (1 April 2009) or the date the Senior Executive Officer first becomes subject to the applicable guideline.

Until the stock ownership guidelines have been met, Senior Executive Officers are required to retain at least 75% of shares obtained under our LTI Plans (net of taxes and other costs). Once Senior Executive Officers have met or exceeded their stock ownership guidelines, they are required to retain at least 25% of shares issued under our LTI Plans through the vesting of RSUs (net of taxes and other costs) for a period of two years

(by way of a holding lock), after which time those shares can be sold (provided the Senior Executive Officer remains at or above the stock ownership guideline).

As of 31 March 2017, all Senior Executive Officers have achieved the minimum share accumulation threshold.

Equity Award Practices

Annual equity awards under the LTI Plan are generally approved by the Remuneration Committee in May of each year with awards generally issued in September of each year. We do not time the granting of equity awards to the disclosure of material information.

For details of the application of our insider-trading policy for equity award grant participants, including our prohibition on employee hedging transactions, see the “Insider Trading” section of our 2017 Annual Report.

Loans

We did not grant loans to Senior Executive Officers during fiscal year 2017. There are no loans outstanding to Senior Executive Officers.

EMPLOYMENT AND SEVERANCE ARRANGEMENTS

During fiscal year 2017, we maintained employment agreements with each of Messrs Gries, Marsh and Fisher. Mr Fisher resigned from his employment on 3 April 2017, and as a result, his employment agreement is no longer in effect. Other than as provided under the terms of their respective employment agreements, no other termination payments are payable, except as required under the terms of the applicable STI or LTI plans.

Employment Agreement with Louis Gries

Below is a summary of the key terms of Mr Gries’ current employment agreement:

Employment Agreement with Matthew Marsh

Below is a summary of the key terms of Mr Marsh’s current employment agreement:

Prior Employment Agreement with Mark Fisher

Prior to his resignation on 3 April 2017, we were a party to an employment agreement with Mr Fisher, which was effective as of 31 March 2006. Below is a summary of the key terms of Mr Fisher’s prior employment agreement: